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Articles
DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL: THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIESt
HAROLD HONGJU KOH*
I first met Stan Herr, appropriately enough, on a conference call,
about eight years ago, while I was still Director of the Orville H. Schell,
Jr. Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School, Stan's
alma mater. The 1995 Special Olympics World Games were about to
be held in New Haven, Connecticut, and were scheduled to be the
largest sporting event to be held in the world that year. Sitting in my
Yale office, I was taken aback to get a call from the White House,
where Stan was working for the Clinton administration as an adviser
on disability issues. I was told cryptically that a "Mr. Herr" was on the
line. My first thought, dusting off my high school German, was that
"Mr. Herr," translated into German, was "Herr Her?' ("Mr. Mister").
Anyone named "Herr Herr," I thought, had to be a mensch.' I was
t [Editor's Note: Some portions of this Article are drawn from an earlier work that
Professor Harold Koh co-authored. The text accompanying notes 13-85 has been drawn
from the Introduction to THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES:
DIFERENT BUT EQUAL.
* Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law and Dean
Designate, Yale Law School; Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, 1998-2001. This Article grows out of the keynote address to the Stanley S. Herr Memo-
rial Conference on Disability Rights held at University of Maryland School of Law in October
2002. I am grateful to Dean Karen Rothenberg, Associate Dean Diane Hoffman, and Lu
Ann Marshall for their heroic efforts in hosting the Herr Conference, and to Allon Kedem
and Jessica Sebeok of Yale Law School for their help in preparing this Article. Finally, let
me say how grateful I am to Larry Gostin, without whose friendship and dedication our
joint tribute to Stan would never have come to fruition.
1. SeeTHE RANDOM HOUSE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1201 (2d ed. 1987)
(defining the Yiddish word as "decent, upright, mature, and responsible person").
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right. The ebullient voice that came booming over the speakerphone
sounded like it came from someone who was at least eight feet tall.
When I actually met Stan a few weeks later, I realized that he was only
6' 5." But he struck me then, as he strikes me now, as a giant of a
man, who used his special stature to lead, to stand up for others, and
to see much farther than lesser persons.
Over the speakerphone, Stan proposed what at first struck me as
an absurdly ambitious plan: to convene at Yale Law School in early
1995, in connection with the Special Olympics World Games, an inter-
national symposium on the rights of people with mental retardation.
Why not bring together at Yale, Stan asked, the leading spokespeople
from two of the greatest social movements of the past half-century: the
international human rights movement and the disability rights move-
ment? We would talk about disability rights as human rights. We
would ask the pressing question "should difference make a differ-
ence" in a legal sense? Should human beings with mental disabilities
be treated as legally different, simply because they are physically or
intellectually different from individuals lucky enough to be born with-
out such disabilities?
At the time, I knew virtually nothing about the disability rights
movement, but the answer to that question struck us both as intui-
tively obvious: the statement in Article I of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights that "[a] 11 human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights,"2 contained no footnote that said "except for per-
sons with mental disabilities." In 1971, the U.N. General Assembly
had adopted without a dissenting vote a Declaration on the Rights of
Mentally Retarded Persons that proclaimed, in seven concise articles,
that persons with mental retardation have "the same rights as other
human beings," including the right to "a decent standard of living;"
normal modes of life, protective services, and legal protection from
"abuse and degrading treatment[;]" and "proper legal safeguards."3
Why, we asked each other, had that Declaration never become an in-
ternational treaty? And wasn't the fortuity of having the Special Olym-
pics in Yale's hometown an opportune moment to give impetus to a
new global lawmaking exercise by developing a 'Yale Declaration" on
the International Human Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities?
And so, in March 1995, we co-sponsored at Yale Law School a
conference on the International Human Rights of Persons with
2. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. I, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
3. G.A. Res. 2856 (XXVI), U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 93, U.N. Doc. A/
8429 (1971).
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Mental Disabilities.4 Like everything with which Stan was involved, it
was a little bit different. We heard not just from Americans, but from
people all around the world, who hailed not just from developed, but
also from developing countries.5 We heard from lawyers, academics,
doctors, scientists, and, most importantly, from persons with mental
retardation, speaking as their own self-advocates. 6 One of the most
eloquent conference spokesmen that day was our good friend Profes-
sor Larry Gostin, the Director of the Center for Law and Public
Health at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown, who then, as today, spoke
about the relationship between human rights and mental health.7 As
the conference ended, we issued the Yale Declaration, which reaf-
firmed the universality of human rights and called on all nation-states
to bring about without delay the full enforcement of the rights of per-
sons with mental retardation.'
I remember all of that, but another memory sticks in my mind.
At the dinner that closed the conference, Stan made all of us stand up
holding our wine glasses and sing Russian songs, whose words only he
knew. I will never forget the sight of Stan-this giant of a man-with
his eyes closed, rocking back and forth, booming out a Russian folk
song, as if privy to a private melody that the rest of us could not yet
hear. But as he sang the tune over and over again, it became familiar.
Eventually, we all joined in, following his lead, until we created a har-
mony more beautiful than any of us could have imagined.
My message today is simple: as it was with Stan's music, so, too,
should it be with Stan's work.
4. Sandra Park, Meeting Addresses Retardation, YALE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 27, 1995, available
at http://www.yaledailynews.com/article.asp?AID= 7 6 7 9 .
5. See id. (explaining that the attendees had traveled from as far away as the Middle
East and Europe).
6. One such participant was Mitchell Levitz, whose life story is chronicled in DIFFER-
ENT BUT EQUAL. Mitchell Levitz, Voices of Self-Advocates, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS
WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 453 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds.,
2003) [hereinafter DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL] (discussing the challenges of intellectual disabil-
ities from the perspective of a person with a disability).
7. Professor Gostin's contributions to disability law scholarship are noteworthy. See
Adrienne Asch et al., Respecting Persons with Disabilities and Preventing Disability: Is there a
Conflict?, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL, supra note 6, at 319 (discussing the challenges involved
in promoting disability prevention, while also encouraging the full inclusion of individuals
with disabilities; Lawrence 0. Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human Rights of Persons with
Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application of Human Rights Principles to Mental
Health, 63 MD. L. REv. 20 (2003) (encouraging the use of international law to improve the
lives of people with intellectual disabilities).
8. Yale Declaration, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL app., supra note 6, at 517-25.
20041
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
When the Yale conference ended, we vowed to publish the vol-
ume as a book, called "Different But Equal." The thesis of the book
would be captured in its title: persons with disabilities are different but
equal. However different persons with disabilities may be, they are
nevertheless born free and equal in dignity and rights and, hence, are
entitled to equality of respect and treatment, even if that equality does
not entail identical treatment under all circumstances. The book and
the Yale Declaration on which it was based, we decided, could some-
day be a cornerstone for a binding international convention designed
to enshrine the human rights of persons with intellectual disabilities.
That was our plan. But before we could finish the book, fate led
us both down unexpected paths. In 1998, I was appointed to serve as
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
in the Clinton administration.9 In that job, I encountered advocates
for persons with physical and mental disabilities. I visited hospitals,
mental institutions, prisons, and jails in which persons were incarcer-
ated simply for being different.' 0 And as I traveled the world dealing
with human rights crises in such places as Kosovo, East Timor, Colom-
bia, and Sierra Leone, I often thought of Stan, singing his lonely song,
waiting for the rest of us to join in.
And so, it was hardly a surprise when just two days after I left the
government in January 2001, I heard Stan's voice again on the
speakerphone, still booming, announcing with passion that it was time
for us to finish our book, and, to make that possible, he had per-
suaded Larry Gostin to join our enterprise. What I learned only later
was that Stan had already discovered the cancer that would take him
from us, and that he hoped very much to make this volume the final
piece of his legacy.
At the Stanley S. Herr Memorial Conference on Disability Rights and
Social Justice, Larry Gostin and I were proud to announce the comple-
tion of our last journey with Stan Herr, the publication of The Human
Rights of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: Different but Equal, by the
Oxford University Press, with a Foreword by the just-departed U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson.1' Although
9. See United States Institute for Peace, Promoting Democracy and Human Rights: The
Continuing Agenda, Dec. 13, 2000, available at http://www.usip.org/events/pre2002/koh.
html (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) (providing audio and video archives of a presentation made
by Professor Koh while serving in the Clinton administration).
10. See, e.g., Eric Rosenthal et al., Not on the Agenda: Human Rights of People with Mental
Disabilities in Kosovo (2002), at 15-17, available at http://www.mdri.org/pdf/KosovoReport.
pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) (discussing the arbitrary detention of individuals with disabili-
ties in Kosovo).
11. Mary Robinson, Foreword, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL, supra note 6, at v.
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Stan did not live to see its publication, his spirit moves throughout the
pages. The book contains three different chapters by him and many
of the ideas that motivated our original 1995 conference. 12 And like
Stan's last Russian song, through the book runs a melody that none of
us could hear, until Stan sang it so many times, we could not help but
join the harmony.
The melody is simple and runs something like this: the rights of
persons with intellectual disabilities are part and parcel of the interna-
tional human rights movement.' 3 Since World War II, international
human rights have been defined as embracing those universally recog-
nized inalienable rights to whose enjoyment all persons are entitled
solely by virtue of being born human.' 4 The list of universal rights is
specified in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' 5 and
elaborated in the International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights' 6 and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,' 7 both of
which have been almost universally signed and ratified.'" At the 1993
Vienna Conference on Human Rights, nearly all nations of the world
joined in a declaration that called these rights universal, indivisible,
and interdependent.1 9 These instruments, our book argues in its in-
troduction, require us to frame the concerns of persons with intellec-
tual disabilities not simply as a social problem, but as a human rights
imperative.2 °
12. Stanley S. Herr, From Wrongs to Rights: International Human Rights and Legal Protec-
tion, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL, supra note 6, at 115 [hereinafter From Wrongs to Rights];
Stanley S. Herr, The Potential of Disability Non-discrimination, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL, supra
note 6, at 203 [hereinafter Disability Non-discrimination Laws]; Stanley S. Herr., Self-Determi-
nation, Autonomy, and Alternatives for Guardianship, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL, supra note 6, at
429 [hereinafter Alternatives for Guardianship].
13. Herr, From Wrongs to Rights, supra note 12, at 115 ("People with intellectual disabili-
ties are an integral focus of a growing international human rights movement.").
14. Harold Hongju Koh & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Introduction: The Human Rights Impera-
tive, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL, supra note 6, at 1.
15. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), supra note 2.
16. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966), available at http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr.htm (last visited
Oct. 7, 2003).
17. Id. at 49.
18. See The Two International Covenants on Human Rights, at http://www.droitshumains.
org/uni/Formation/02LesPactesa.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003) (noting that 141 states
have ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and
that 144 states have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
19. United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1664 (1993) [herein-
after United Nations World Conference on Human Rights].
20. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 1.
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During the last half-century, the promotion of human rights has
come to be recognized not simply as an American or Western value,
but as a universal value with internationally recognized meaning." In
fact, however, countries with entrenched traditions of socialism and
social democracy have more broadly embraced notions of economic,
social, and cultural rights than have such market capitalist countries as
the United States.22
For more than half a century, the international human rights
movement focused almost entirely on the activities of the able-bodied
and the able-minded.23 But over the last two decades, existing human
rights networks have finally broadened their focus beyond the rights
of "traditional and visible minorities"-including people of color, eth-
nic and religious minorities, women, children, and refugees-to the
rights of what might be called "invisible, underprotected minorities,"
particularly persons afflicted with HIV/AIDS, gays and lesbians, per-
sons with disabilities, and those afflicted with mental illness.24
Discrimination against each of these groups has become a serious
and neglected problem that affects large numbers in every society.25
Because each of these groups has traditionally been hidden from
mainstream society, each has long been subjected to widespread, un-
redressed discrimination, which traditionally has been neither well-
chronicled nor subjected to sustained public scrutiny or criticism.2 6
21. See, e.g., United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, supra note 19 (demonstrat-
ing unity of international community in recognizing human rights).
22. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 1.
Those in the United States who are wary of economic, social, and cultural rights
have generally argued that the guaranteed provision of housing, schooling,
health care, and the like would have broad redistributive implications and would
place impossible burdens on federal, state, and local governments to provide so-
cial services. while these skeptics rarely object to guaranteeing the "freedom
from" rights-[e.g.], freedom from genocide, torture, discrimination, arbitrary
punishment, and other forms of overt government invasion-they contend that
similarly guaranteeing "freedom to" rights-such as rights to housing, education,
and health-would create unsustainable burdens on the public fisc. In so assert-
ing, their hesitation has been reinforced in [U.S.] domestic law by judicial deci-
sions by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, which have drawn the constitutional
line between strong protection of civil and political rights and a refusal to recog-
nize constitutional rights to health care and education. This mindset has created
a growing schism-both between the United States and developing nations and
within the United States-between wealthy and underprivileged groups who see
securing economic, social, and cultural rights as a practical precondition to [the]
meaningful enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Id at 1-2.
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id
25. Id.
26. Id.
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From a human rights perspective, the intellectually disabled rank
among the world's most vulnerable and at-risk populations, both be-
cause they are different and because their disability renders them less
able either to assert their rights or to protect themselves against bla-
tant discrimination.27
In dealing with persons with intellectual disabilities, many govern-
ments fail to distinguish between two groups with distinctly different
problems and needs: those with mental retardation and those with
mental illness. 28 According to the American Association on Mental
Retardation,
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present
functioning. It is characterized by [three characteristics: 1]
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, [with an IQ
tested below 70] existing concurrently with [2] related limi-
tations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social
skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, func-
tional academics, leisure, and work. [And 3,] [m]ental retar-
dation manifests before age 18.29
Mentally ill persons, by contrast, may exhibit very high intelli-
gence, shifting adaptive skills, and may become afflicted (or cured) at
any time during their lives.3" As the recent Oscar-winning movie, A
Beautiful Mind, vividly illustrated, even Nobel Prize-winners can suffer
and-with enough support from their loved ones and community-
overcome mental illness.31
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2-3 (citing AMERICAN ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th ed. 1992)). The American
Psychiatric Association's definition similarly states: "The essential feature of Mental Retar-
dation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is ac-
companied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of com-
munity resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety
(Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retarda-
tion has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various
pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous system." AMERI-
CAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th
ed. 2000). "Mild" mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level
of 50-55 to approximately 70. Id. at 42-43.
30. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 3.
31. See SYLVIA NASAR, A BEAUTIFUL MIND (1994) (recounting the compelling story of
the brilliant mathematician John F. Nash, who overcame mental illness and won the Nobel
Prize in Economics).
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Like the disabled at large, the vast majority of the world's intellec-
tually disabled still live in horrifying conditions.3" As Mary Robinson
has noted:
We know that persons with disabilities frequently live in
deplorable conditions, and face physical and social barriers,
which prevent their integration and full participation in the
community. As a result, millions of adults and children
throughout the world are segregated, deprived of virtually all
their rights, and sometimes lead wretched and marginalised
lives.
Because of their incapacity to protect or even to understand their own
interests, the intellectually disabled are at the greatest risk.3 4 Mental
institutions and psychiatric hospitals worldwide stand in dismal condi-
tion, and patients often contend with inhumane and unsanitary living
conditions, where they are treated as subhuman prisoners and receive
little or no medical care.35
Our book calls on the world to make concrete the principle of
"different but equal. '3 6 That task is easier said than done. Making
concrete the "different but equal" principle raises challenges for gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental organizations at both a national and
international level.37 National and international organizations share a
joint responsibility to ensure that rights proclaimed in international
norms and national legislation are translated into genuine and con-
crete improvements in the lives of persons with intellectual disabili-
ties.3 s Human rights workers need to learn how to help intellectually
disabled persons speak up for their own rights and how to integrate
the language, tools, strategies, and networks of the international
human rights movement into their daily struggle for dignity, equality,
and justice.3 9
For human rights advocates, this is a familiar task. In building
new global human rights regimes, a pattern has emerged, whereby
advocates focus on five priorities: first, on reconceptualizing the disability
32. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 3.
33. Mary Robinson, "Let the World Know": Report of a Seminar on Human Rights and Disa-
bility, available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/stockholmnov2O0a.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2003).
34. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 3; see also Rosenthal et al., supra note 10, at 6-11
(detailing the wretched conditions present in one Kosovo psychiatric institution).
35. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 3.
36. See id. ("[H]owever different persons with disabilities may be, they are nevertheless
born free and equal in dignity and rights.").
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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question as a human rights issue; second, on developing knowledge, third,
on developing transnational issue networks to address problems; fourth,
on developing legal precedents under domestic law, or what I have elsewhere
called "norm-internalization;""° and fifth, on using that reconceptualiza-
tion, knowledge, and domestic precedent to help crystallize interna-
tional standards.4
This pattern has emerged in numerous new areas of human
rights law, for example, in the campaign for an International
Landmines treaty and in the effort to create a global ban on the illicit
transfer of small arms.42 Such a pattern has also begun to unfold with
respect to the intellectually disabled, as advocates have sought first, to
reconceptualize disability as a human rights issue, and only second-
arily as a medical issue.4" Treating intellectual disability as a human
rights issue directly addresses, and seeks to readjust, the power rela-
tionships that shape the unequal treatment of the disabled.44 As Mary
Robinson put it:
The most important tool in tackling inequality is to enable
those experiencing it to remedy the power relationship, to
take some control. This is a concept of rights that requires
that those who are furthest from the cabinet table own the
rights that inhere to them by virtue solely of their humanity.
Ownership of this kind enables them to describe their condi-
tion, then to challenge it, and then to ensure that any deci-
sions taken in the organisation and the ordering of their
lives are made "by and with" them, not "about and for"
them.45
The second step has been the formation of what I have elsewhere
called a "transnational human rights network" that has worked to ex-
40. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2602 (1997) (discussing "transnational legal process: the complex process of institutional
interaction whereby global norms are not just debated and interpreted, but ultimately in-
ternalized by domestic legal systems") (emphasis omitted).
41. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 4.
42. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home,
35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 655-63 (1998) (discussing the landmines convention) [hereinafter
Koh, Lecture]; Harold Hongju Koh, A World Drowning in Guns, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333,
2341-49 (2003) (discussing nascent efforts to regulate small arms and light weapons)
[hereinafter Koh, Guns].
43. See Disabled Persons International, International Day of Persons with Disabilities, at
http://www.dpi.org/en/resources/press-releases/report.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003)
(discussing the U.N.'s World Disability Report, in which U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Mary Robinson, notes that "law-makers are beginning to accept that disabil-
ity is first a human rights issue and, only secondly, a medical matter").
44. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 4.
45. Mary Robinson, Equality and Rights, EQUALiTY NEWS, Summer 2000, at 5, available at
http://www.equality.ie/pdf/NEWSLETT.PDF (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
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pose worldwide discrimination against persons with intellectual disa-
bilities.4 6 That global network of human rights nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) now includes such organizations as Inclusion
International, Mental Disability Rights International, Rehabilitation,
and Sister Witness International (as well as such "general-purpose
NGOs" as Human Rights Watch), all of which are dedicated to investi-
gating, publicizing, and calling for action on international disability
issues in such countries as Russia, Romania, Latin America, and Ko-
sovo. 47 In August 2002, for example, one of those NGOs, Mental
Rights Disability International, grabbed headlines around the world
by releasing a report about psychiatric hospitals in Kosovo. 48 That re-
port demonstrated that, even under U.N. supervision, women are
raped by male patients while staff watch; that mentally retarded pa-
tients sit in prolonged enforced idleness in conditions of appalling
filth; and that patients are often drugged rather than counseled,
threatened with retaliation for charges of abuse, and frequently left
without meaningful treatment or instruction.49
A third step has been to litigate discrimination issues involving
the intellectually disabled under domestic law.5" Domestic advocates
in Ireland, for example, have made high-profile use of international
law in O'Donoghue v. Minister for Health,5" in which the High Court con-
cluded that the government had deprived a child with a disability of a
free appropriate education in violation of broad guarantees of a free
required education under Ireland's Constitution.52 In Department of
Health and Community Services v. j WB. (In re Marion),53 the High Court
of Australia severely restricted a guardian's right to authorize the in-
voluntary sterilization of a person with an intellectual disability.54
These issues have also been extensively litigated in the United States,
particularly in the well-known Pennhurst and Mills litigations.55 These
46. See Koh, Lecture, supra note 42, at 649 (discussing the establishment of transnational
issue networks to promote the "internationalization" of norms).
47. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 4.
48. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 10 (detailing human rights abuses of persons with
mental disabilities in Kosovo).
49. See Oliver Burkeman, UN 'ignored' Abuse at Kosovo Mental Homes, THE GUARDIAN,
Aug. 8, 2002, at 2; Editorial, Forgotten by the U.N., WASH. PosT., Aug. 18, 2002, at B6; Edith
M. Lederer, Report of Abuse in Kosovo Clinics, WASH. PosT, Aug. 8, 2002.
50. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 4.
51. [1993] 2 I.R. 20 (Ire.).
52. Id at 71.
53. (1992) 175 C.L.R. 218.
54. Id. at 252-53.
55. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the
school board must provide specialized education to students with mental disabilities);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd
[VOL. 63:1
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court cases eventually spurred enactment of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 197556 (later called IDEA, the Individu-
als with Disabilities Education Act) ,7 which effectively allowed the re-
turn of some one million children previously excluded from the
American public school system due to their perceived mental
handicaps.5 8
These lawsuits are examples of what I have elsewhere called
"transnational legal process."5 9 As I have explained elsewhere, I be-
lieve that nations obey international law for a variety of reasons:
power, self-interest, liberal theories, communitarian theories, and
what I call "legal process" theories.6 ° While all of these approaches
contribute to compliance with international law, the most overlooked
determinant of compliance is what I call "vertical process": when in-
ternational law norms are internalized into domestic legal systems
through a variety of legal, political, and social channels, and obeyed as
domestic law.6" In the international realm, as in the domestic realm,
most compliance with law comes not from coercion, but from obedi-
ence, or norm-internalization, the process by which domestic legal sys-
tems incorporate international rules into domestic law and obey it as
domestic law.62
in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (addressing whether mentally
retarded residents of a state hospital are entitled to minimum levels of care, safety, and
rehabilitation).
56. Pub. L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et
seq.).
57. Pub. L. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et
seq.).
58. Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 5. In American case law, the high water mark was
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), which cited the 1971 U.N. Declaration
and included reference to international human rights standards in making its decision. Id.
at 390-91 n.6. In general, U.S. courts have seldom used international human rights law to
redress human rights abuses, though now they are increasingly willing to do so. See Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366-75 (1991) (dis-
cussing increased acceptance of international law in recent domestic litigation). In other
countries, as one of Professor Herr's chapters chronicles, judges have made strong use of
human rights declarations for persons with intellectual disabilities. Herr, From Wrongs to
Rights, supra note 12, at 134.
59. See Koh, supra note 40, at 2645-58 (analyzing nations' motivation for compliance
with international law).
60. Id. at 2645-58; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L.
REv. 181, 199-206 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Legal Process] (assessing why nations obey inter-
national law); Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
L.J. 1397, 1401 (1999) [hereinafter Koh, International Human Rights] (discussing the rela-
tionship between enforcement and obedience in international law).
61. Koh, Lecture, supra note 42, at 535-36.
62. Koh, Legal Process, supra note 60, at 204.
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Under this view, the key to understanding whether nations will
obey international law is transnational legal process: the process by which
public and private actors-namely nation states, corporations, inter-
national organizations, and nongovernmental organizations-interact
in a variety of fora to make, interpret, enforce, and, ultimately, inter-
nalize rules of international law.63 The key elements of this approach
are interaction, interpretation, and internalization.64 Those seeking
to create and embed certain human rights principles into interna-
tional and domestic law should trigger transnational interactions, that
generate legal interpretations, that can in turn be internalized into the
domestic law of even resistant nation states.6 5
In my view, "transnational legal process" is not simply an aca-
demic explanation of why nations do or do not comply with interna-
tional law, but, more fundamentally, a bridging exercise between the
worlds of international legal theory and practice.66 Human rights ac-
tivists too often agitate without a clear strategy regarding what pres-
sure points they are trying to push or why they are trying to push
them.67 Scholars by contrast, have ideas, but often lack practical un-
derstanding of how to make them useful to either decisionmakers or
activists.8 My claim is that, by triggering transnational legal process,
activists can promote interactions-lawsuits, legislative, and treaty-
drafting efforts-that generate legal interpretations that can be inter-
nalized into domestic law.6 9 But the movement is not simply one-way.
63. This argument is presented more fully in a forthcoming book, tentatively entitled
WHY NATIONS OBEY: A THEORY OF COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAw. The pieces of
the argument may be found in Koh, International Law, supra note 40, at 2645-58; Koh,
Lecture, supra note 42, at 535-36; Koh, Guns, supra note 42, at 2349-60; Koh, Legal Process,
supra note 60, at 204; Koh, International Human Rights, supra note 60, at 1401; and Koh,
supra note 58, at 2358-75.
64. Koh, Lecture, supra note 42, at 535-36.
65. See id. at 64142 (explaining how, in the context of the Third United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, when nations participate in transnational legal interactions,
"even resisting nations cannot insulate themselves forever from complying with particular
rules of international law").
66. See id. at 655-63 (noting the effectiveness of transnational legal process in working
toward the ratification of the Landmines Convention).
67. See id. at 657-60 (noting that anti-landmines activists initially focused their efforts
on the U.S. government, then the United Nations, and ultimately the "Ottawa Process," an
alternative convention framework).
68. See Koh, International Human Rights, supra note 60, at 1416 (arguing that rather than
simply engaging in scholarship on the subject, lawyers have a "duty... to try to change the
feelings of that body politic to promote greater obedience with international human rights
norms").
69. See Koh, Lecture, supra note 42, at 646-50 (arguing that local and transnational activ-
ists can interact with government to produce normative change). As this Article went to
press, the Inter-American Human Rights system produced a graphic example of the use of
transnational legal process to promote norm-internalization in the area of mental disabili-
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Just as activists can promote the domestication of international law
(the "trickling down" of international legal standards into the domes-
tic system), they can equally promote the internationalization of
norms that have been initially developed and hardened at the domes-
tic level (the "bubbling up" of domestic law).70
That is what domestic disability rights activists have tried to
achieve as their domestic efforts have spurred nascent efforts to de-
velop and harden an international standard regarding the rights of
the mentally disabled."' Throughout this fifth stage in the interna-
tional human rights strategy, international standard setting, the
United Nations has played an increasingly proactive role in working
for global recognition of human rights of people with intellectual dis-
abilities by launching the International Year of Disabled Persons,72 the
World Programme of Action and the Decade of Disabled Persons,73
and the World Summit on Social Development.7 1 In 1971, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Mentally
Retarded Persons. In 1975, the U.N. endorsed a Declaration on the
Rights of Disabled Persons that covers some one-half billion persons
who suffer from a mental or physical disability.76 In 1993, the General
ties. In December 2003, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of
the Organization of American States (OAS) approved provisional measures to protect 460
people detained in a psychiatric institution in Paraguay. Two human rights nongovern-
mental organizations, Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI) and the Center for
Justice and International Law (CEJIL), had sought the IAHCR's intervention to prevent
conditions threatening the lives, liberty, and personal security of a 17-year old and an 18-
year old boy held along with 458 others in the Neuro-Psychiatric Hospital of Paraguay.
The petition was the first ever brought before the IACHR to challenge ongoing abuses
against people in a psychiatric facility. The LACHR requested that the Government of
Paraguay adopt "all necessary measures" to protect the lives, and physical and mental safety
of the 460 people detained in the institution, with special attention to the situation of
women and children detainees. For the current state of the case, see the Mental Disability
Rights International website at http://www.MDRI.org.
70. See Koh, International Human Rights, supra note 60, at 1414 (describing how the
"trickle down" and "bubble-up" phenomena in the context of the Torture Victim Protec-
tion Act led to the U.S. ratification of the U.N. Torture Convention).
71. See Robinson, supra note 33 (discussing the "joint responsibility of the national and
international level" to ensure the implementation of human rights disability standards).
72. G.A. Res. 123, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 39, at 104, U.N. Doc. A/31/395
(1976).
73. World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons: Report of the Secretary General,
G.A. Res. 52, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/37/351/Add.1 and Corr. 1, annex,
§ VIII, recommendation I (IV) (1982).
74. The World Summit on Social Development was held in March 1995 and recon-
vened in June 2000. World Summit for Social Development, at http://www.un.org/esa/
socdev/wssd (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
75. G.A. Res. 2856, supra note 3, at 93.
76. G.A. Res. 3447, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975).
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Assembly adopted the Standard Rules on the Equalization of Oppor-
tunities for Persons with Disabilities.7" This led in 1994 to the ap-
pointment of a U.N. Special Rapporteur on Disability, as well as to a
recently published study commissioned by the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights to evaluate expressly the effective-
ness of existing international mechanisms on the rights of the
disabled.7"
The issue of what should constitute the core elements of this in-
ternational standard is discussed throughout our book.7' The core el-
ements are now commonly recognized to include such rights as access
to tools for exercising individual agency; participation and inclusion in
critical decisions that affect the disabled person's life and future; and
freedom for disabled individuals to exercise proactively their rights,
both personally and through agents.8 ° Advocates have also made a
powerful case that those with mental retardation should have their
own legal authority to make their own decisions about having and rais-
ing children."' For those with mental illness, the right to treatment re-
mains a paramount concern. 2 Many societies continue to regard the
mentally ill as outcasts, rather than as patients in need of health care,
institutionalizing the curable and driving millions suffering from
mental illness from seeking help for fear of long-term detention or
social stigmatization. 3 Also not to be forgotten are the distinctive
needs of individuals whose intellectual disabilities only exacerbate
77. G.A. Res. 48/96, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/96
(1993). Similarly, the U.N. Economic and Social Council in 2001 adopted a resolution to
further promote the rights of individuals with disabilities. See U.N. EXCOR, 56th Sess.,
43rd plen. mtg., at 23, U.N. Doc E/RES/2000/10 (2000).
78. See United Nations Human Rights resolution 2000/51 of 25 April 2000, Official
Records of the Economic and Social Council, Supp. No. 3 and corrigendum (E/2000/23
and Corr.1), chap. II, § A (2000).
79. See Koh & Gostin, supra note 14, at 6-20 (providing an overview of the content in
DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL).
80. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2856, supra note 3, at 93 (asserting that a disabled person has the
right to education and other services to enable him to maximize his potential and the right
to a qualified guardian, if needed, to ensure his legal rights).
81. See MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 64-65 (1999) (arguing that persons
with retardation should be allowed to decide for themselves whether to have children).
82. This concern persists despite the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of
Mentally Retarded Persons, which declares that "[t] he mentally retarded person has a right
to proper medical care and physical therapy." G.A. Res. 2856, supra note 3.
83. See, e.g., Rosenthal et al., supra note 10, at 6-15 (describing the deplorable
conditions).
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their existing human rights vulnerabilities, for example, refugees and
children who suffer from mental health problems.84
The Yale Declaration, announced in March 1995 at the end of
the Yale Conference (and reproduced as an Appendix to our vol-
ume) ,85 represents perhaps the most progressive effort thus far to
enumerate the elements of an authoritative international human
rights instrument that could forthrightly address this issue. 8  Six years
later, the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban, South Africa,
closed with a recommendation to the General Assembly to "consider
elaborating a comprehensive and integral international convention to
promote and protect the rights and dignity of disabled people, includ-
ing, especially, provisions that address the discriminatory practices
and treatment affecting them. ' 87 In December 2001, the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly adopted a historic resolution calling for a comprehen-
sive and integral International Convention to promote and protect
the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities.88 In time, the U.N.
84. In her address to the October 2000 International Consultation on Mental Health
of Refugees and Displaced Populations in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, High Com-
missioner Mary Robinson explained:
We also have a better understanding now of the degree to which persons affected
by conflict and post-conflict situations are especially vulnerable to mental health
problems. Professionals involved in complex emergencies must address the deli-
cate issues arising with regard to mental health. Victims themselves must be able
to recognize that the trauma of conflict can cause mental health problems. Both
should be able to seek support, without fear of stigmatization.
World Health Organization, Concluding Statement from the International Consultation on
Mental Health of Refugees, available at http://www.whomsa.org/it/text8/04_statement.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
85. Yale Declaration, supra note 8, at 517.
86. The Yale Declaration declares, inter alia, that "[aIll states must immediately begin a
process of reforming their laws and public policies to achieve or exceed international stan-
dards and begin an inclusive planning process to bring about full enforcement of human
rights for people with mental retardation in their own country." Id. at 517-18. The Decla-
ration further recommends that nations utilize the United Nations Standard Rules on the
Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities as a guide in implementing this
process. Id. at 518. The Declaration also issues recommendations regarding how nations
might increase and prioritize their resources, and encourages the adoption of model ser-
vice programs that respect the rights of individuals with mental retardation. Id. at 521-22.
87. Report of the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenopho-
bia and Related Intolerance, U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.189/12, Chap. I, para. 180 (2001).
88. Resolution on Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and Protect
the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 168, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/56/168 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/disA561
68el.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003). The resolution established an ad hoc committee to
consider proposals for this convention and invited member states, relevant human rights
treaty bodies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and other entities
to participate. Id.
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process may well culminate in Stan Herr's dream: a ratifiable treaty
barring discrimination against the disabled. 9
This five-part international human rights strategy-a transna-
tional legal process that moves through the stages of conceptualiza-
tion, knowledge, networks, domestic change, and international
standard setting-was completely familiar to Stan Herr. Indeed, he
worked on every element of this strategy, quite literally until the last
hours of his life. I know that for a fact, because the last time that Stan
and I worked together was not as authors or editors, but as lawyers,
when we filed an amicus curiae brief at the United States Supreme
Court in what became a landmark decision: the Court's June 2002
decision in Atkins v. Virginia."° That case reopened for the first time
in thirteen years the question raised in Peny v. Lynaugh:9 whether
the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment
to the United States Constitution forbids execution of persons with
mental retardation.92
Initially, my students, co-counsel, and I were asked to write an
international law amicus brief in support of the defendant with mental
retardation in McCarver v. North Carolina.9 3 But while that case was
pending, North Carolina passed a law forbidding execution of per-
sons with mental retardation,94 leading the U.S. Supreme Court to
dismiss certiorari in the McCarver case as improvidently granted.95
The Court then granted the certiorari petition of Daryl Atkins, a simi-
larly situated defendant with mental retardation, and permitted all
amici curiae briefs originally filed in McCarver to be refiled in support
of the same position in Atkins. 6
As we prepared the brief, my students, co-counsel, and I commu-
nicated with nine former U.S. diplomats, who collectively had ren-
dered more than two centuries of service to both Democratic and
89. See generally Herr, Disability Non-discrimination Laws, supra note 12, at 203-24 (discuss-
ing nations' domestic implementation of the international human rights standards on non-
discrimination set forth by the U.N.).
90. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Atkins held that the execution of a convict with mental retar-
dation violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Id. at 321.
91. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
92. Id. at 307.
93. 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (mem.).
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2005 to -2006 (West 2002).
95. McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (mem.).
96. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002) (stating in the reporter's note that
the Court granted the motion of the amici curiae filers in McCarver to have their briefs
considered in support of the Atkins petitioner).
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Republican administrations.97 When we spoke with these diplomats,
we learned that some of them opposed the administration of the
death penalty in all circumstances.9" Some opposed it only with re-
gard to people with mental retardation or juveniles.9 9 But all agreed
upon three propositions: first, that this practice was inconsistent with
international standards of decency;1 0 second, that continuing to exe-
cute persons with mental retardation would strain our diplomatic rela-
tions, increase our diplomatic isolation, and impair U.S. foreign policy
interests;10' and third, that these considerations should lead the Court
to hold that the practice of executing people with mental retardation
had become so "unusual" as to offend our "evolving standards of de-
cency" and hence, the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 1 2
These diplomats authorized us to file an amicus brief before the U.S.
Supreme Court arguing that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
should be read to forbid this practice."0 '
As we began our research, we initially guessed that there were
several countries in the world that permitted the execution of persons
with mental retardation. But as we studied, we were stunned to learn
that the United States was in fact the only country in the world that
97. That illustrious group included four ambassadors-Morton Abramowitz, Thomas
Pickering, J. Stapleton Roy, and Frank Wisner-who hold the title of Career Ambassador,
the highest rank awarded in the United States diplomatic corps. The diplomats included
Morton Abramowitz, Stephen W. Bosworth, Stuart E. Eizenstat, John C. Kornblum, Phyllis
Oakley, Thomas R. Pickering, J. Stapleton Roy, and Frank G. Wisner. For further discus-
sion of the background to the diplomats' brief in Atkins, see Harold Hongju Koh, Paying
"Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAvis L. Rv. 1085, 1119-21
(2002) (providing additional information on the diplomats and the development of argu-
ments used in their Atkins brief).
98. Harold Hongju Koh et al., American Foreign Servicemen's brief regarding Mental Retarda-
tion and the Death Penalty, available at http://deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Oct. 29,
2003) [hereinafter Koh et al., Servicemen's brie]].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 102 (1976)).
103. We reasoned that former diplomats were entitled, as friends of the Court, to advise
the Court regarding the likely impact the continuing administration of the death penalty
against individuals with mental retardation would have upon our diplomatic relations with
foreign governments and upon our standing in the international community. Id. The
Court had long held that international law standards "may be ascertained by consulting the
... general usage and practice of nations," United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,
160-61 (1820), "and[ ] as evidence of these .. .the works of... commentators, who by
years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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regularly executed persons with mental retardation. 0 4 Even China,
for example, long the world's leader in executions, had banned the
execution of persons with mental retardation since imperial times.' 05
When we filed our brief, we noted that of the minority of nations in
the world that still retain the practice of capital punishment, only
two-the United States and Kyrgyzstan-still openly executed people
with mental retardation.'0 6 But soon after we filed, we learned that in
1999, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev had in fact signed into law a mor-
atorium on executions and announced a plan that would eliminate
capital punishment by 2010 in an effort to confirm the nation's "com-
mitment to basic human rights and freedoms."'0 7 When the New York
Times reported on our brief, Kyrgyzstan's ambassador to Washington
sent a letter to the editor pointedly noting that Kyrgyzstan no longer
conducted executions, implying that his country would never be so
barbaric as to join the United States in this aberrant practice.' 08
Given this unanimity of state practice, our brief argued first, that
the U.S. practice of executing persons with mental retardation vio-
lated customary international law, which "is part of our law, and must
be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropri-
ate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination."'10 9 Second, we argued as a
matter of constitutional law that a practice so cruel and uncivilized as
to be banned by the federal government, a majority of the states of the
United States, and by every other country in the world was plainly "un-
usual," and hence should be barred by a Constitution that forbids
"cruel and unusual" punishments.110
In Atkins, the Supreme Court finally struck down the practice of
executing persons with mental retardation.' t In so doing, the
Court's majority specifically took note that "within the world commu-
nity, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."112 In
104. See Koh et al., Servicemen's brief supra note 98 (stating that the "current United
States practice of executing people with mental retardation has become manifestly incon-
sistent with evolving international standards of decency").
105. Id. at n.10.
106. Id.
107. Douglas Frantz, World Briefing: Asia: Kyrgyzstan: Death Penalty Moratorium, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2002, at A8.
108. See Baktybek Abdrisaev, Editorial, Penalties in Kyrgyzstan, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2001,
at A14 (declaring that "there is no execution of the mentally ill in Kyrgyzstan").
109. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
110. Koh et al., Servicemen's brief supra note 98.
111. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
112. Id. at 317 n.21.
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dissent, Justice Scalia raged that the practices of the "world commu-
nity" are "irrelevant" to American constitutional interpretation be-
cause they reflect "notions of justice [which] are (thankfully) not
always those of our people.""' 3 Nonetheless, in the following term,
the Court again rejected Justice Scalia's claim". 4 in its landmark deci-
sion striking down state sodomy laws previously upheld in Bowers v.
Hardwick"5 as a violation of the constitutional right to privacy. The
Court held: "To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a
wider civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding
in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere .... The right the petitioners seek
in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many
other countries."' 6 By so saying, our Supreme Court signaled that it
may, at long last, be listening to international and foreign views in
deciding whether our country's conduct meets global human rights
standards.
These trends would have delighted Stan. In our last phone call,
Stan and I talked about our amicus brief in Atkins, which he happily
agreed to sign, his last Supreme Court brief as a human rights advo-
cate. I remember him chuckling about the Kyrgyzstan moratorium on
executions. In the months since he died, I have wondered, was it pos-
sible that when Stan sang that lonely Russian melody in New Haven in
1995, he was really previewing the "Kyrgyz leitmotif' that we would
hear together in the last days of his life?
With the release of our joint volume, and the convening of this
memorial conference, Larry Gostin and I and all of Stan's co-authors
hope to spur the accelerating international movement to treat the
rights of the intellectually disabled as fundamental human rights. We
hope that this conference can be an occasion where every one of us
can recommit ourselves to Stan's dream of building a binding interna-
tional convention to protect the rights of persons with intellectual dis-
abilities. In time, we hope that our academic, litigation, legislation,
and treaty-building work will be remembered as only one of many vari-
ations on Stan Herr's melody. That melody tells us that a genuine com-
mitment to human rights for all requires that people with intellectually
disabilities be treated as different but equal. That is a very simple melody.
But as Stan's remarkable journey teaches, if we all build on his music,
we can follow Stan's voice and create new harmonies more beautiful
than any us could have ever imagined.
113. Id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003).
115. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
116. Id. at 2483(emphasis added).
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